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Equivalence between best responses and undominated





For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce
(1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this
strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note
generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing
players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.
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Rationalizability concepts, on the one hand, and dominance solution concepts,o nt h e
other hand, are solution concepts for strategic games which can be justiﬁed by the
assumption that players involve in an internal process of reasoning which successively
excludes unreasonable strategies1. While rationalizability concepts (Bernheim, 1984;
Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984; Börgers, 1993; Ghirardato and Le Breton, 1997 and 2000)
deﬁne strategies as unreasonable when they are not a best response to some belief,a
strategy is unreasonable according to dominance solution concepts (e.g., Moulin, 1984;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Börgers, 1993) when it is dominated by another strategy.
At ﬁrst glance, these two deﬁnitions of ”unreasonable strategies” seemingly refer
to rather diﬀerent ideas. However, for two player-games with ﬁnite strategy sets, and
under the assumption of expected utility maximizing players, Pearce (1984, Lemma 3)
proves the remarkable result that a strategy is not strictly dominated by some mixed
strategy, if and only if, this strategy is also a best response to some probability measure
over opponents’ strategies. Moreover, Pear c e ’ s( 1 9 8 4 )r e s u l ti se a s i l ye x t e n d e dt on-
player games of expected utility maximizing players as long as strategy sets remain
ﬁnite. As a consequence, Pearce’s ﬁnding establishes equivalence for such games between
the iterative solution concepts of correlated rationalizability and the strict dominance
solution with respect to mixed strategies. Unfortunately, the restriction to ﬁnite strategy
sets only does not permit for the application of Pearce’s (1984) equivalence result to
many strategic games of interest.
This note demonstrates that Pearce’s (1984) equivalence result on unreasonable
strategies can be extended to n-player games of expected utility maximizing players
such that strategy sets are arbitrary compact subsets of a metric space. Moreover, un-
der the assumption that best response correspondences are upper-hemicontinuous, it is
shown for such games that correlated rationalizability and the strict dominance solution
with respect to mixed strategies are equivalent strategic solution concepts.
2N o t a t i o n a n d D e ﬁnitions
Given some set A,l e t4(A) denote the set of all probability measures on the σ-Algebra
of Borel sets of A.F o r a ﬁnite set of players, I,l e tSi denote the individual strategy
set of player i ∈ I, and interpret a point σi ∈ 4(S0
i),w i t hS0
i ⊆ Si,a smixed strategy
1See, e.g., Pearce (1984), Tan and Werlang (1988), Guesnerie (2002) for an epistemic foundation of
iterative solution concepts by the assumption that it is common-knowledge among players that players
do not choose unreasonable strategies.
2of player i with support on S0





,w i t hS0
−i ⊆ S−i =
×j6=iSj, is interpreted as belief of player i about her opponents’ strategy choice in S0
−i.
Moreover, suppose that there exists, for all players i ∈ I,s o m eutility representation
Ui : 4(Si) ×4(S−i) → [0,a] ⊂ R+ of player i’s preferences such that, for all si ∈ Si,
Ui (si,·) is continuous on S−i.
Deﬁnitions:
As t r a t e g ysi ∈ Si is a best response to some belief on S0






, si ∈ fi (σ−i) where fi : 4(S−i) → 2Si denotes player i’s best
response correspondence, i.e., fi (σ−i)=a r gm a x si∈Si Ui (si,σ−i).
As t r a t e g ysi ∈ Si is strictly dominated on S0
−i by some mixed strategy σi ∈ 4(Si),
if and only if, U (σi,s −i) >U (si,s −i) for all s−i ∈ S0
−i. Moreover, for given
S0
−i ⊆ S−i, let gi : S0
−i → 2Si collect all strategies si ∈ Si that are not strictly
dominated on S0
−i by some mixed strategy σi ∈ 4(S0
i).
The two alternative notions of ”unreasonable strategies” - i.e., as t r a t e g yi su n r e a -
sonable, if and only if, it is not a best response to some belief versus as t r a t e g yi s
unreasonable, if and only if, it is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy - give rise to
(seemingly) alternative iterative solution concepts which successively exclude unreason-
able strategies:
Deﬁnition (Pearce, 1984): The set of correlated rationalizable strategies for a game
G is deﬁned as R(G)=
T∞
k=0 λ














Deﬁnition: The strict dominance solution with respect to mixed strategies of game
G is deﬁned as D(G)=
T∞
k=0 ϑ















33R e s u l t s
Pearce derives his equivalence result (Pearce, 1984, Lemma 3) by a saddlepoint argument
for zero-sum games with mixed-strategy spaces (see also Lemma 3.2.1. and 3.2.2. for
bimatrix games in van Damme, 1991). Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) suggest that a direct
application of the separating hyperplane theorem for ﬁnite normed spaces might oﬀer a
shortcut to Pearce’s proof; and indeed the following proposition is based on the more
general Hahn-Banach Theorem (see, e.g., p. 157 in Berge, 1997).
Proposition. Given a game G such that, for all i ∈ I,
(A1) player i is an expected utility maximizer, and
(A2) Si is a compact subset of some metric space.
Then strategy si ∈ Si is not strictly dominated on S−i by some mixed strategy σi ∈
4(Si),i fa n do n l yi f ,t h e r ei ss o m eb e l i e f σ−i ∈ 4(S−i) such that si is a best response
to σ−i.
Before the proposition is formally proved, observe that, by Berge’s (1997) maximum
theorem, the sets λ
k and ϑ
k are compact for all k ∈ N under the assumption of upper-
hemicontinuous best response correspondences and compact strategy sets. Thus, by the
proposition, λ
k = ϑ
k for all k ∈ N.
Corollary. Given a game G such that, for all i ∈ I,
(A1) player i is an expected utility maximizer,
(A2) Si is a compact subset of some metric space, and
(A3) the best response correspondence fi is upper-hemicontinuous.
Then the strict dominance solution of G with respect to mixed strategies coincides
with the set of correlated rationalizable strategies of G,i . e . ,D(G)=R(G).
Proof of the proposition: Since preferences of expected utility maximizing players
obey monotonicity with respect to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, the if-part is obvious.
T u r nt ot h eo n l y - i fp a r ta n dn o t et h a tas t r a t e g ysi is not strictly dominated by some
mixed strategy σi, if and only if, there exists for all σi ∈ 4(Si) some s−i ∈ S−i,
dependent on σi, such that
Ui (σi,s −i) ≤ Ui (si,s −i)
Now deﬁne the set
V (σi)={x : S−i → R | x ∈ C[S−i],x(s−i) <U i (σi,s −i) for all s−i ∈ S−i}
4where C[S−i] equipped with the sup norm is the space of all continuous real valued
functions with domain S−i. Observe that when si is not strictly dominated by some






The set V ⊆ C[S−i] is nonempty, convex and open, and it contains, by lemma 4.43 in
Aliprantis and Border (1994), an internal point as prerequisite for the application of the
Basic Separating Hyperplane Theorem (Theorem 4.42 in Aliprantis and Border, 1994;
also known as Hahn-Banach Theorem, see p. 157 in Berge, 1997). By this theorem,
there exists some linear functional T ∈ (C[S−i])
∗ -w i t h(C[S−i])
∗ denoting the norm
dual of C[S−i] - which separates the singleton {Ui (si,·)} from V , i.e.,
T (x) <T({Ui (si,·)}) for all x ∈ V (1)
where the direction of the inequality is due to the fact that the values x(s−i) can be
chosen arbitrarily small.
Let B(S−i) denote the set of all ﬁnite Borel measures on S−i equipped with the
variation norm.S i n c eS−i is a compact subset of a metric space, the Riesz-Markov char-
acterization theorem (see Theorem 11.41 and Corollary 11.44 in Aliprantis and Border,






such that B(S−i) and (C[S−i])
∗ are isometric. As a consequence, there exists a ﬁnite






Ui (si,·)dµ for all x ∈ V (2)
where continuity of x and Ui (si,·) on S−i ensure that these integrals are well deﬁned.









µ(S−i) for the Borel sets S0






Ui (si,·)dσ−i for all x ∈ V (3)
Since, by construction, any value Ui (σi,s −i) can be approached, arbitrarily close, by
the value x(s−i) of some function x ∈ V , the system of inequalities (3) implies, for all
σi ∈ 4(Si), Z
S−i




5In words: given belief σ−i,p l a y e ri’s expected utility of choosing strategy si is maximal
on Si. Thus, when si is not strictly dominated by some mixed strategy σi ∈ 4(Si) there
exists some belief σ−i ∈ 4(S−i) such that si is a best response to σ−i for an expected
utility maximizing player.¤
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